ture. Reports indicate that Western sanctions caused a 7% drop in Russia's oil production in 2023, while Iran, due to export restrictions, only exports about 1.5 million barrels of oil per day far below its actual capacity. Moreover, the global financial system, dominated by the US dollar, complicates banking transactions and payments between Iran and Russia, forcing them to resort to barter trade and local currencies.

Infrastructural difficulties and the need for massive investments also hinder energy cooperation between the two nations. Many of Iran's oil and gas fields require modern technology for extraction and production, but sanctions prevent Western companies from operating in Iran. At the same time, Russia, facing its own investment challenges, lacks the financial capacity to fund major energy projects in Iran. For instance, the development of Phase 11 of Iran's South Pars gas field — one of the world's largest — has faced delays since France's Total withdrew in 2018 due to sanctions and a lack of investment. While Iran needs over \$80 billion in investments to develop its oil and gas sector, Russia, struggling with declining energy

trend has directly affected Iran-Russia relations, making economic and trade interactions more difficult. One clear example of this shift is the recent US and European policies on energy security. After the Ukraine crisis and extensive sanctions on Russia, the European Union significantly reduced its reliance on Russian gas. In 2022, US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Europe increased by over 140%, and Russia's share in Europe's gas supply fell from 45% in 2021 to less than 10% in 2023. This change indicates that even markets previously dependent on Russian energy are now seeking alternatives — a trend that could affect Iran and Russia's ability to se-

cure new buyers. Furthermore, the Biden administration's Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 allocated billions of dollars to renewable energy development, reducing reliance on fossil fuels. This policy led to a record-high US oil production of 13.2 million barrels per day in 2023, decreasing Western countries' need for Iranian and Russian energy and pushing these two countries to vie harder for Asian and African markets.



purchasing discounted Russian oil, is diversifying its imports from countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These developments suggest that even the Asian markets, which are currently attractive to Iran and Russia, may change course in the long term.

In conclusion, the rise of economic nationalism and efforts to reduce reliance on foreign energy pose new challenges for Iran-Russia cooperation. As history has competitions, and technological advancements in the energy sector. Examining these paths can provide a clearer view of the outlook for energy relations between the two countries.

Scenario one: Deepening cooperation and creating an independent energy bloc. In this scenario, Iran and Russia will expand their cooperation in the energy sector and seek to form an independent energy bloc separate from the West. Contracts such as the \$40 billion MoU between Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company, and efforts to develop joint projects in energy extraction and transportation, can strengthen this path. Moreover, given that Iran and Russia collectively hold over 65% of the world's gas reserves, they can play a more decisive role in the global energy market in this way. However, realizing this scenario requires massive investments, infrastructure development, and coping with Western pressures, which makes its implementation difficult.

Scenario two: Hidden competition and gradual reduction of cooperation. Despite official announcements of strategic cooperation, competition between Iran and Russia over energy markets, particularly in China, India, and Turkey, is a serious challenge. Following Western sanctions, Russia has increased its oil exports to Asian markets, and its share in China's oil market reached over 19% in 2023, while Iran's share in the same market was only 6%. Russia is seeking to maintain its position at any cost. In such circumstances, cooperation between the two countries may turn into an ongoing but imperceptible competition that reduces its

importance in the long term. Scenario three: External

The rise of

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in the energy

market.

Then-CEO of the National Iranian Oil Company Mohsen Khojastehmehr (C) is seen during the online ceremony of signing a memorandum of understanding worth around \$40 billion with Russia's Gazprom company on July 19, 2022, in Tehran • MOJTABA MOHAMMADGHOLI/ SHANA

to both countries is the rapid changes in the global energy market and the reduction of the world's dependence on fossil fuels. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global investment in renewable energy reached over 1.7 trillion in 2023, while investment in the fossil fuel sector was only 1 trillion. This indicates that in the coming decades, consumer countries will seek to reduce their dependence on oil and gas, a trend that can decrease demand for Iran and Russia's energy resources. If this scenario materializes, even the strategic alliance between the two countries cannot prevent their declining influence in the global market.

Future of uncertainty, susceptibility

While Iran and Russia seek to reduce reliance on the West and strengthen bilateral cooperation, factors such as competition for export markets, geopolitical instability, sanctions, and structural shifts in the global energy market could make this partnership fragile and temporary. For this cooperation to succeed, both countries must overcome internal and external challenges and adopt a long-term strategy.



revenues due to sanctions, cannot adequately support such projects.

In summary, despite the 1973 oil crisis that took further limit opportunities political and economic incentives driving Iran and Russia toward closer energy cooperation, regional competition, sanctions, and infrastructure limitations create substantial barriers. The lack of a unified strategy and financial constraints obscure the long-term prospects of this alliance, making its full realization uncertain.

This kind of global change has taken place before. In the 1970s, following the and this ongoing trend may place after the Arab oil

shown, global policy shifts can reshape trade routes, for Iran and Russia in the



Impact of global policies, economic nationalism

In recent years, the rise of economic nationalism and protectionist policies in developed countries has challenged the traditional global energy market. What have further complicated international energy cooperation are the increasing efforts of governments to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers and boost doembargo against the West, many industrial countries set out to branch out their energy resources. This policy led to the development of oil reserves in the North Sea and a boost in domestic production in the US, which ultimately brought about a reduction in the West's dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Today, a similar move is taking place, and Western countries are not only looking to get away from their dependence on Russian and Iranian energy, but nationalist economic policies have also reinforced this trend. Even in Asia, significant shifts are occurring. China, one of the largest buyers of

Iranian and Russian energy, is expanding its domestic energy production and developing shale gas projects. Meanwhile, India, despite

energy market.

Scenarios for future of cooperation

The cooperation between Iran and Russia in the energy sector is taking shape amidst a backdrop of numerous opportunities and challenges. Considering various geopolitical, economic, and technological variables, several probable scenarios can be envisioned for the future of this cooperation. These scenarios are influenced by factors such as Western sanctions, changes in global policies, regional

The jacket for the Belal Gas Field development project, constructed with a \$16 million investment, is loaded out from the Sadra Yard in Bushehr, southern Iran, on January 22, 2025. ALIREZA KHAZRAEI/SHANA

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi nt-2nd L) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (front-L) are seen attending the event. president.ir

factors reducing Iran and Russia's influence. One of the main threats

