
Oil output capacity up 127,000 bpd over past year, minister says



Iran Daily

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Iran says seeking to preclude snapback activation

Tehran calls E3 demands 'unrealistic preconditions'





Iran-China trade sees y/y hike prior to Pezeshkian's trip



INTERVIEW EXCLUSIVE

A member of the Iran-China Chamber of Commerce said non-oil trade between the two countries had risen by 12 to 15 percent last year compared with 2023

In an interview with Iran Daily, Arash Nikpey Salekdeh noted that the value of Iran-China non-oil trade reached \$34.1 billion in 2024, an increase of 12 percent from the year before.

Iran exported around \$14.8 billion worth of goods to China in 2024 while imports from China amounted to roughly \$19.3 billion, he added.

"Iran's and China's economies are complementary," Nikpey Salekdeh said. "Economic cooperation between Iran and China is of particular importance for both sides." He added that

political and geopolitical closeness had created strong ground for trade, though "barriers and challenges still prevent faster development of economic cooperation."

The development comes as President Masoud Pezeshkian leads a high-level delegation to China today to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and SCO Plus summits, a visit that comes as non-oil trade between Tehran and Beijing continues

One driver of trade growth, he said, has been Iran's effort to reduce its reliance on oil. Under intensifying sanctions, Tehran prioritized non-oil exports — especially petrochemicals, minerals and agricultural products to rebalance trade. China, for its part, has shown strong interest in rail, energy and in-

frastructure projects under the 25-year cooperation plan



Is Israel a water expert?




CAFA Nations Cup:









Composer Ahmad Pejman, first Iranian to write for opera, dies at 90

Appointing special envoy could help forestall snapback of **UN sanctions**



PINI

A move by the three European parties to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (ICPOA) - France, Britan and Germany (E3) - to initiate the process of activating the snapback of UN sanctions on Iran is both unethical and unlawful, since none of their commitments under the accord have been met. At a time when pressure on Iran from US President Donald Trump and the Israeli regime was mounting, the E3 chose to fall back on only one part of the JCPOA namely the snapback mechanism. Following Washington's withdrawal from the deal in 2018, Europeans claimed they were under US pressure and threats, stressing that their companies—because of deep ties with American firms—could not maintain economic cooperation with Iran, while European governments lacked the power to force through such collaboration. Europe later put forward the IN-STEX mechanism as a substitute for its commitments—essentially a version of "oil for food" once imposed on Iraq back in 1990s. Iran rejected this outright and adopted reciprocal measures, including enrichment at 20% and later 60%, the use of advanced centrifuges, curbs on inspections, and taking down surveillance cameras of the UN nuclear watchdog (IAEA).

During Trump's first term, the E3 resisted US pressure to restore UN resolutions and stood by Iran. Yet over time, and particularly after the war in Ukraine, relations soured. creating deeper rifts between the E3 and Tehran. The debate over Iran's alleged cooperation with Russia in Ukraine prompted the Europeans to take a tougher line, seeing Tehran as siding with Moscow against them.

As the E3 realized their legal window for "snapback" was closing by October 2025, they sent a letter to the UN Security Council this week, requesting activation. Russia and China objected, with Moscow formally asking the council to extend the JCPOA's timeline by six months to allow diplomacy a chance. Whether such a proposal will be adopted is unclear, as US approval would be required.

Although Iran maintains that current US sanctions are far harsher than UN measures, the reinstatement of Security Council sanctions would still carry heavy political and psychologi-

cal consequences, since all UN member states would be obliged to comply.