

Araghchi:
Tehran, Minsk to
draw roadmap to
make best use of
capacities



Eslami: Iran ready to consider IAEA protocol for targeted nuclear sites

Kamalvandi: Safeguards Agreement ignores post-war circumstances
Iran holds 'firm legal position'

INTERVIEW




Off-field issues threaten to derail Iran's World Cup ambitions

PERSPECTIVE
EXCLUSIVE



Japan pledges €210,000 in medical aid to shore up healthcare in southern Iran

INTERVIEW
EXCLUSIVE



Nuclear-assisted cancer diagnostics, therapeutics unveiled at Tehran tech expo

AEOI: Radiopharmaceutical portfolio expands to 70 products



Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref (2nd R) and Iranian nuclear chief Mohammad Eslami (R) unveil a radiopharmaceutical developed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in Tehran on December 15, 2025.

IRNA

US National Security Strategy signals both opportunity & threat for Iran

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OPINION
EXCLUSIVE

The US National Security Strategy document, recently released by the Trump administration, states that Iran had previously posed a threat to regional stability and security but, following the June 2025 attacks, has been weakened and no longer constitutes a threat to the region. Decoding this assertion becomes possible only when the broader framework of the document, one that lays out US foreign policy, is taken into account. This assessment of Iran's position appears to carry three distinct messages. First, within the framework

of coercive diplomacy, Washington is seeking to convey to Tehran that it still wants an agreement in which Iran would make the maximum concessions while the United States insists on its longstanding position of zero enrichment. The Trump administration believes that Iran's weakened position obliges it to offer greater concessions. This runs counter, however, to the logic of coercive diplomacy, which emphasizes that its success increases when the coercing power—in this case, the United States—offers more incentives. By reiterating the correctness of Trump's Iran policy over the past year, the National Security Strategy effectively narrows the path toward reaching a new agreement. The second message of the document regarding Iran is directed at Israel. Tel Aviv favors an expanded US mil-

itary presence in the region. Yet the document implicitly sends a signal to Israel and the Jewish lobby in the United States that, since Iran has been undermined and is no longer a regional threat, there is no justification for pressuring Trump to align with a potential attack on Iran. This point is of considerable importance. Some pessimistic analysts have even suggested that the wording may imply that Washington has effectively handed the Iran file in the region over to Israel and does not intend to manage the issue directly itself. Put more simply, it may have left the door open for Israel to carry out possible military actions against Iran. The third message is aimed at three Arab states, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, that are major investors in the United States. Given that these countries

have pledged to invest roughly \$3 trillion in the US economy in the coming years, reassurance about America's supportive role is critically important to them. They seek certainty that, should threats to their security arise, Washington will provide sufficient backing. The continuation of their investments depends on confidence that Iran does not pose a serious threat. By stating that Iran has been dented, the Trump administration is effectively attempting to shore up confidence and encourage these countries not to reconsider their investment commitments. Although the National Security Strategy broadly states that the United States will no longer engage in unnecessary military interventions beyond its borders, pressure from the Jewish lobby and possibly from Arab states has led the document to stop short of

explicitly declaring opposition to military action or regime change in Iran. Nonetheless, the overarching spirit of the document suggests that the United States will resort to such actions only in exceptional circumstances. In general terms, the strategy can therefore be seen as containing both opportunities and threats for Iran. It represents an opportunity insofar as Washington explicitly rejects state-building through regime change, and a threat because, in deference to the interests of its regional allies, the United States has chosen deliberately ambiguous language regarding Iran. From a more pessimistic reading, the document does not categorically rule out military action against Iran, yet it also does not advocate it. The conclusion, therefore, is that the US framework for dealing with Iran remains rooted in coercive diplomacy.