

earlier thinkers of the Continental tradition who examine the Christian system of valuation from a genealogical perspective. Of course, Nietzsche, like Schmitt, does not offer an extended explicit treatment of the concept of sanctions and their historical roots; here, on the basis of his chosen method, an attempt shall be made to infer certain points in this regard. However, prior to that, concerning the precedence of Schmitt over Nietzsche (despite Nietzsche's chronological priority), it should be recalled that it is solely on account of Schmitt's more mature methodological framework in the discussion of political theology and because the general Schmittian spirit dominates this writing that his view was presented first.

In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche initiates a project whose objective is the disclosure of the concealed origin of values; in his conviction, morality is born not of reason or revelation, but of the conflict of social forces — though not in the Marxist sense thereof. According to this genealogy, sanctions arise from a kind of theology of judgment that the weak exercise against the strong.

According to Nietzsche, in the beginning, aristocratic morality was founded upon the affirmation of life, and the concept of "good" was employed to mean powerful, noble, and beautiful. But the "slaves," who lacked the capacity for "action," inverted values through a spiritual reaction to oppression; instead of "action," they created judgment. As a rule, religious sanction — in the sense of prohibition (haram) and exclusion — constitutes the primary instrument of this judgment: the sanctioning of strong actions, the sanctioning of pleasure, the sanctioning of beauty, the sanctioning of pride, et cetera. This inversion, according to Nietzsche, was "one of the most important events in Western history," for from then on, humanity became its own enemy within itself.

From Nietzsche's perspective, God and the concept of sin likewise determine these judgments; God is the ultimate judge and absolute sanctioner, transforming the morality of slaves into the law of existence. Consequently, sanctions become the mechanism for the survival of suffering; humanity, in order to endure suffering, finds meaning in sin.

In Nietzschean logic, sanctions possess an intrinsic connection with guilty conscience: sanctions are that inner voice that commands, prohibits, and directs its wrath toward its own subject. Sanctions, in this sense, constitute the internal mechanism of obedience. Consequently, the theology of sanctions from Nietzsche's perspective signifies the theology of the tormented conscience in a world whose god is preserved through cursing and exclusion. But how, from this point, can one draw a line to politics and modern international relations? Based on what has been stated, one can propose the proposition that political and economic sanctions represent the reproduction of that same mechanism of moral conscience on a collective scale, through which the state or the international community, by imposing sanctions upon others, defines itself.

In other words, sanctions in Nietzschean genealogy — like Schmitt — constitute the secularized form of divine cursing,



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Nietzsche ironically designates this logic as the incapacity to suffer pain: an order that, instead of creating new values and tolerating the rival order, passes judgment and sanctions adversarial forces. In the theology of sanctions, this judgment transforms into a system of power; yet it remains the case that the same spirit of revenge by the weak against the strong is at work.

Sanctions as an instrument of behavioral control

Another comparable framework through which the discussion of sanctions may be examined is the theoretical model of Michel Foucault. Foucault extends Nietzsche's genealogy to the level of institutions and bodies. In his works from the earlier phase of his thought — from *The Order of Discourse* to *Discipline and Punish* — he demonstrates that modern power operates not through overt command, but through a network of sanctions: the sanctioning of speaking, of seeing, and even of being.

In *The Order of Discourse*, he maintains that every society constructs a system of prohibitions (taboos) that determines who may speak and about what one may or may not speak. From this perspective, the sanctioning of speech constitutes the constructor of truth: that which cannot be spoken delineates the boundary of knowledge. Consequently, sanctions represent the primary constitutive act of knowledge.

It is worthy of note that Foucault's formulation bears an interesting resemblance to Wittgenstein's views, both in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and in the *Philosophical Investigations*; in the former, he determines the boundaries of the sayable and the unsayable, and in the latter, he determines legitimate linguistic discourses under the theories of language-games and family resemblance. Of course, the point of departure, the te-

los, and the methodology of Wittgenstein differ from those of Foucault.

In *Discipline and Punish*, sanctions are transferred from the domain of speech to the "body". Power no longer tortures the body; rather, it disciplines it. Punishment migrates from public spectacle to closed institutions (the school, the prison, the hospital), and in all these cases, sanctions do not negate but rather systematize: "Sanctions signify conditional permission to live!"

In his subsequent phase, with the concept of "biopower," Foucault demonstrates that sanctions constitute part of the mechanism for managing populations; modern states exercise control over the life of citizens not through death, but through the management of birth, health, illness, et cetera. Political and especially economic sanctions also follow this logic: the control of the adversary's behavior through the management of the target society's life.

At this level — contrary to the preceding negative levels — sanctions represent a kind of positive power; they no longer merely exclude, but rather shape. Foucault considers this the distinguishing feature of modern power as opposed to sovereign power: Sanctions, according to this framework, appear restrictive, but in reality, they are constitutive of a particular type of subject and reality (truth). Consequently, the theology of sanctions from Foucault's perspective signifies a theology of discipline. God here is not a judge, but an overseer: precisely as modern society, through its "panoptic" gaze, compels individuals toward obedience.

Modern sanctions constitute modern penance; a perpetual surveillance of behavior.

But on the international scale, one can state that, according to Foucault's view, sanctions represent the mechanism for containing forces, organizations, and adversarial states that do not conform to the



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logic of the international system. Sanctions, within this framework, constitute an instrument of pressure and behavioral modification of the opponent, preceding military warfare — an instrument that, in the view of some, constitutes a prelude to war; and, in the view of others, a factor for avoiding military aggression.

Divine economy and the ontology of sanctions

Another theoretical framework, influenced by Schmitt — or at least following the general spirit of his thought — is the model stated by the phenomenologist Giorgio Agamben. Agamben continues Schmitt's project with a critical perspective; in his books *State of Exception* and *Homo Sacer*, he demonstrates that the foundation of all modern politics is not law, but rather "exception". *Homo sacer* is the human who is excluded from the legal order, yet remains within the sphere of its power; "one who may be killed, but not sacrificed."

Sanctions, from this perspective, reproduce this same condition: a population that is deprived of its right to life and its right to death, yet remains ensnared within the global order. Sanctioned peoples are the modern *homines sacri*.

In *State of Exception*, Agamben demonstrates that the exception is no longer a temporary condition; rather, it is the very form of government, and sanctions today are permanent, not transient. Humanity lives in a condition of "institutionalized exception"; consequently, the boundary between war and peace, and between legality and lawlessness, is effaced.

But the most explicit views of Agamben regarding sanctions are to be sought in his book *The Kingdom and the Glory*. Concerning economic theology, he maintains that modern power, in the form of "oikonomia" (Greek for "government of men," also the root word for economy), originates from theology, that is, a governance that administers the world through a combination of justice and efficiency. On this basis, economic sanctions can be regarded as one of the secularized forms of "divine economy": punishment for the sake of salvation, and control for the sake of redemption.

Thus, the theology of sanctions in Agamben's view is not merely ethical or political, but is fundamentally ontological: a decision concerning life that is livable and death that is unlivable; sanctions signify the definition of who falls within humanity and who falls outside it.

From an international perspective, Agamben's view similarly resembles Schmitt's, and according to his perspective, one can state that the dominant international discourse, through the construction of ostensibly pacific meanings, not only excludes rival or adversarial forces from the domain of conventional order, but also from the circle of humanity, in order to legitimize its subsequent conduct, including the deprivation of their right to life. In Agamben's logic, sanctions constitute the glorious garment of justice in appearance, draped over a kingdom devoid of mercy (grace).

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